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Abstract Deep neural networks have been demonstra-
ted to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks: sutle pertur-
bations can completely change the classification results.
Their vulnerability has led to a surge of research in this
direction. However, most works dedicated to attacking
anchor-based object detection models. In this work, we
aim to present an effective and efficient algorithm to
generate adversarial examples to attack anchor-free ob-
ject models based on two approaches. First, we con-
duct category-wise instead of instance-wise attacks on
the object detectors. Second, we leverage the high-level
semantic information to generate the adversarial exam-
ples. Surprisingly, the generated adversarial examples it
not only able to effectively attack the targeted anchor-
free object detector but also to be transferred to at-
tack other object detectors, even anchor-based detec-
tors such as Faster R-CNN.
Keywords Adversarial Example · Anchor-Free Object
Detection · Category-Wise Attack · Black-Box Attack
1 Introduction
The development of deep neural network has enabled
significant improvement in the performance of many
computer vision tasks. However, many recent works
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show that deep learning-based algorithms are vulnera-
ble to adversarial attacks [4,8,51,6,9,42,49,31,2]: adding
imperceptible but specially designed adversarial noise
can make the algorithms fail. The vulnerability of deep
networks is observed in many different problems [3,5,
23,21,52,47,29,14,10], including object detection, one
of the most fundamental tasks in computer vision. Ad-
versarial examples can help to improve the robustness
of neural networks [24,35,36,1,39] or to help explain
some characteristics of the neural network [11].
Regarding the investigation of the vulnerability of
deep models in object detection, previous efforts mainly
focused on classical anchor-based networks such as Faster-
RCNN [41]. However, the performance of anchor-based
approaches is limited by the choice of the anchor boxes,
and fewer anchor leads to faster speed but lowers accu-
racy. Thus, advanced anchor-free models such as Dense-
Box [20], CornerNet [22] and CenterNet [55] are becom-
ing increasingly popular, achieving competitive accu-
racy with traditional anchor-based models with faster
speed and stronger adaptability. However, as far as we
know, no existing research has been devoted to the in-
vestigation of their vulnerabilities. Adversarial attack
methods for Anchor-based [50,55] are usually not ap-
plicable to anchor-free detectors because they generate
adversarial examples by selecting the top proposals and
attacking them one by one.
To solve these problems, we propose a new algo-
rithm, Category-wise Attack (CA), to attack state-
of-the-art anchor-free object detection models. It has
modules that jointly attack all the instances in a cate-
gory (see Fig. 1 for details). Unlike most of the existing
works [23,3,5,50,55] which use anchor proposal for the
attack, we select a set of highly informative pixels in the
image according to the heatmap that generated by the
anchor-free detector to attack. Those highly informa-
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Fig. 1 Left: Instance-wise attack. The attacker attacks individual objects one by one. Right: Our category-wise attack
algorithm. The attacker attacks all the objects in a category at the same time.
tive pixels are the keypoints of detected objects which
contains higher-level semantic information for the de-
tector. Additionally, as category-wise attack is challeng-
ing, we introduce two Set Attack methods based on
two popular adversarial attack techniques, which were
originally proposed for attacking image classification
models by minimizing the L0 and L∞ perturbations [30,
15], for attacking object detection models with sparse
and dense perturbations, named as Sparse Category-
wise Attack (SCA) and Dense Category-wise Attack
(DCA) respectably.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is not only
the first on attacking anchor-free object detectors but
also the first on category-wise attack. When DAG at-
tacking is applied for semantic segmentation that only
attack detected segmentation area on the input. Differ-
ent from DAG, our methods not only attack all detected
objects but also attack potential objects that have a
high probability to transfer to the rightly detected ob-
jects during the attack. Our methods generate adver-
sarial perturbation on larger areas than DAG which can
avoid the perturbation overfitting on attacking detected
object. Generate perturbation on detected objects and
potential objects can bring better-transferring attack
performance.
We empirically validated our method on two bench-
mark datasets: PascalVOC [13] and MS-COCO [26].
Experimental results show that our method outper-
forms the state-of-the-art methods, and the generated
adversarial examples achieve superior transferability.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are three-
fold:
– We propose a new method for attacking anchor-free
object detection models. Our category-wise attack
methods generate more transferable and robust ad-
versarial examples than instance-wise methods with
less computational overhead.
– For two widely used Lp norms, i.e. L0 and L∞, we
derive efficient algorithms to generate sparse and
dense perturbations.
– Our methods are not only attacking detected pix-
els but also attacking the potential pixels. Thus,
our methods generate perturbation on high seman-
tic information and achieve the best black-box at-
tack performance on two public datasets.
Comparing to instance-wise attack methods, our cat-
egory wise methods focus on global and high-level se-
mantic information. As a result, they are able to gener-
ate more transferable adversarial examples. Our paper
is organized as follows. We first discuss the related work
in section 2. Then, we provide the details of our meth-
ods in section 3. The detailed setup and results of our
experiment are described in Section 4. Finally, we con-
clude the paper in section 5.
2 Related Work
Object Detection. With the fast development of the
deep convolutional neural networks, many methods have
been proposed for object detection [54,33,45]. We briefly
divide them into anchor-based and anchor-free approaches.
Anchor-based object detection models include Faster-
RCNN [41], YOLOv2 [40], SSD [27], Mask-RCNN [18],
RetinaNet [25]. Anchor-based object detectors currently
achieve relatively higher detection performance.
However, they suffer from two major drawbacks:
1) the network architecture is complex and difficult
to train, and 2) the scales of the anchors have to be
adjusted to adapt to specific applications, making it
difficult to transfer the same network architecture to
other dataset/tasks. Recently, anchor-free models like
CornerNet [22], ExtremeNet [56] and CenterNet [55]
achieve competitive performance with the state-of-the-
art anchor-based detectors. These models detect ob-
jects by extracting object key-points. In contrast to
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anchor-based detectors, anchor-free methods are easier
to train and free from issues of scale variance.
Adversarial Attack for Image Classification. Good-
fellow et al. [16,46] first showed that deep neural net-
works are vulnerable to adversarial examples: adding
deliberately generated imperceptible perturbations to
the input images can make the deep neural networks
output totally wrong results. Since then, a lot of efforts
have been devoted to this line of research [7,17]. To
be perceptually imperceptible, most existing adversar-
ial attack algorithms aim to minimize Lp norm of the
adversarial perturbations. L2 and L∞ norms are two of
the most widely used.
Among all the attack algorithms, two most effec-
tive schemes are FGSM [15] and PGD [28]. The proce-
dure of FGSM as follow. First, the gradient of the loss
with regard to the input image is computed. Then, the
perturbation is assigned with the maximum allowable
value in the direction of the gradient. Instead of tak-
ing a single large step in FGSM, PGD iteratively takes
smaller steps in the direction of the gradient. Compared
with FGSM, PGD achieves higher attack performance
and generates smaller perturbations. To generate even
smaller perturbations, Deepfool was proposed in [32]. It
uses the hyperplane to approximate the decision bound-
ary and iteratively computes the lowest euclidean dis-
tance between the input image and the hyperplane to
generate the perturbations.
However, these methods suffer from one problem:
the generated perturbations are extremely dense–these
algorithms have to change almost every pixel of the in-
put image. As a result, the L0 norm of the perturbation
is extremely high. To address this issue, some sparse
attack algorithms such as JSMA [38], Sparse Fool, and
One-Pixel Attack [44] are proposed to generate sparser
perturbations.
Adversarial Attack for Objection Detection.
The research on the vulnerability of object detection
models is scarce. Xie et al. [50] revealed that anchor-
based object detection algorithms are susceptible to
white-box attacks. UEA [55] leveraged generative ad-
versarial networks (GANs) to improve the transferabil-
ity of adversarial examples. While DAG and UEA achi-
eved the SOTA attack performance on anchor-based de-
tectors, they suffer from three shortcomings: (1) DAG
and UEA are based on instance-wise attacks, which
only attack one object at a time. As a result, the pro-
cess is extremely inefficient especially when there exist
many objects in the input image. (2) UEA relies on a
separate GAN network, which needs to be trained each
time before being used on a different dataset. There-
fore, it is more complex to apply it to a new prob-
lem/dataset than optimization-based methods. (3) Ad-
Overall Heatmap
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Fig. 2 First row: Detected results and the overall heatmap
of CenterNet [55]. Second row: Selected target pixels (Red)
for each category.
versarial examples generated by DAG show poor trans-
ferability. While anchor-free object detection models
are becoming increasingly popular, no existing research
has been devoted to attacking these anchor-free detec-
tors. Notably, DAG and UEA can not be applied to at-
tack anchor-free models as they attack detectors by at-
tacking the top proposals and anchor-free detectors do
not rely on proposals. Similarly, other anchor proposal-
based attackers [23,3,5] are also not applicable.
3 Approach
Anchor-free object detectors take as input an image
and yield a heatmap for each object category. Then,
the objects in the bounding boxes of each category
are extracted from the corresponding heatmap with
non-maximum suppression. This motivates us to pro-
pose category-wise attack instead of instance-wise at-
tack. In this section, we introduce the details of the
proposed Category-wise Attack (CA) algorithms. We
first formally formulate our category-wise attack prob-
lem in Section 3.1. Then, in Section 3.2, we introduce
the category-wise target pixel set selection procedure,
which is used in both SCA and DCA. Finally, we pro-
pose SCA and DCA to generate sparse and dense per-
turbations respectively in Section 3.3 and 3.4.
3.1 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formally define the category-wise at-
tack problem for anchor-free detectors. Suppose there
exist K object categories which include the detected
object instances, Ck (k = 1, 2, ...,K). We denote the
pixels of all the detected object instances in category
Ck on the original input image x as target pixel set Pk.
And p denotes a detected pixel of an object instance.
4 Quanyu Liao et al.
Specifically, it is formulated as a constrained optimiza-
tion problem:
minimize
r
‖r‖p
s.t. ∀k, p ∈ Pk
argmaxn{fn(x+ r, p)} 6= Ck
tmin ≤ x+ r ≤ tmax
(1)
where r is the adversarial perturbation. ‖·‖p is the
Lp norm, with p possibly be 0, 1, 2, and ∞. x denotes
the clean input. x+ r denotes the adversarial example.
f(x+ r, p) denotes the classification score vector (logis-
tic) and the fn(x + r, p) denotes the n
th value of the
score vector. arg maxn{fn(x + r, p)}) denotes the pre-
dicted object category on a detected pixel p of object
of adversarial example x + r. tmax, tmin ∈Rn are the
maximum and minimum allowable pixel value, which
constrains r.
In this work, we approximate Pk with the heatmap
of category Ck generated by CenterNet [55], an anchor-
free detector. The details are described in section 3.2.
3.2 Category-wise Target Pixel Set Selection
The first step of our methods is to generate the target
pixel set to attack, which is composed of the detected
pixels and the potential pixels (details in the third para-
graph) from the heatmap of the CenterNet.
The attacking procedure of anchor-based attackers
is equivalent to using all the available proposals to at-
tack the targeted object instance. Such a mechanism
changes non-informative proposals, such as some pro-
posals covering the whole image or very small scope
of the image, leading to a higher computational over-
head. Instead of attacking all available proposals, we
leverage the heatmap, which contains higher-level se-
mantic information for the detectors. To illustrate this
procedure, we use Fig. 2 as an example. Fig. 2 shows
the detected results, overall heatmap of the CenterNet
[55], and the selected target pixels for each category. As
is shown in Fig. 2, we divide the detected pixels on the
overall heatmap into target pixel set {P1, P2, ..., Pk}.
In principle, after attacking all detected pixels, the
CenterNet should not detect any object on the adver-
sarial example which closes to the origin input. But the
CenterNet still detect the same object after attacking
all detected pixels, similar situation also happened in
DAG [50]. We check up the heatmap and make sure all
detected pixels are changed to the incorrect category
and find two reasons that why he CenterNet still work.
After
Attack
Previous
Detected
Pixel
New
Detected
Pixel
After
Attack
(a) (b)
Fig. 3 Red points denote the detected pixels. Blue point
denotes the attacked pixels. (a)-Left & (b)-Left: The de-
tected pixel is centered in the center of the person. (a)-
Right: Result of only attacking the detected pixels. The
neighbor pixel of the previously detected pixel is detected
as the correct object by the detector during the attack. This
makes IOU not significantly lower. (b)-Right: Result of only
attacking the detected pixels. The center of the top half and
the bottom half of the person appear new detected pixels
which still detected as person. Which is also makes IOU not
significantly lower.
– The neighbor pixels are changed to the previous
correct category and be detected as the correct ob-
ject by the detector. Such as some neighbor back-
ground pixels’ confidence levels are increased that
make themselves become the detected pixel with the
correct category. Because the newly detected pixels’
location is near to the previously detected pixels, so
the newly detected object has the same category as
the old object, and the detected box of the newly
detected object is close to the old detected object.
See Fig. 3-(a).
– The CenterNet regards the center pixels of the ob-
ject as the key-points. So in some cases, after at-
tacking the detected pixels which are centered in
the center of the object, newly detected pixels ap-
pear in the other position of the object. An example
is shown in Fig. 3-(b).
We call the pixels that may produce the above two
changes as potential pixels. These two effects make
the CenterNet capable of detecting the correct object
on the adversarial example. To solve these two effects,
our method not only attacking the detected pixels but
also attacking the potential pixels.
In order to attack detected pixels and potential pix-
els at the same time, the target pixel set Pk is decided
by setting an attack threshold tattack. The pixels whose
probability score in the heatmap is above the tattack are
regarded as target pixels and attacked. Setting tattack
can help us construct Pk that include detected pixels
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Fig. 4 Illustration of SCA, we use the ‘Car’ category in Fig.
2 as an example. The dash lines are the approximated linear
decision boundaries in two consecutive iterations. The two
images on the right side are the visualization of the normal
vector w. We can see that the weights for the ‘Car’ object are
reduced (yellow box).
and potential pixels. The process for constructing Pk is
summarized as follows:
Pk = {p | p > tattack}
s.t. p ∈ heatmap
argmaxn{fn(x+ r, p)} = Ck
(2)
where the heatmap denotes the heatmap of the Cen-
terNet and heatmap ∈ [0, 1]WR ×HR×n. W and H denote
the width and height of the input image. R denotes the
output stride of the CenterNet and the n is the number
of pixel category of the heatmap.
The weakly supervised attack can also help the at-
tack algorithm to leverage the heatmap to perceive global
and higher-level category-wise semantic information, and
also reduce the computation time by avoiding attack
the instance one by one. We use the target pixel set P
as the input for both SCA and DCA.
3.3 Sparse Category-wise Attack
The goal of the sparse attack is to make the detectors
generate false prediction while perturbing the minimum
number of pixels in the input image. This is equivalent
to setting p = 0 in our optimization problem (1).
Sparse Fool [30] was originally proposed to generate
sparse perturbations for the image classification task.
It utilizes a linear solver process to achieve lower L0
perturbations. In this section, we illustrate how to in-
tegrate the Sparse Fool method into our anchor-free
object detection attacking algorithm, which we term as
Sparse Category-wise Attack (SCA) in this paper.
The proposed SCA algorithm is summarized in Al-
gorithm 1. Given an input image x and category-wise
Algorithm 1 Sparse Category-wise Attack (SCA)
Input: image x, target pixel set {P1, P2, ..., Pk},
available categories {C1, C2, ..., Ck}
Output: perturbation r
Initialize: x1 ← x, i← 1, j ← 1, P(i) ← P
while {P1, P2, ..., Pk} 6∈ ∅ do
K = argmaxk
∑
p∈Pk softmaxCk f(xi, p)
Ptarget,j=1 ← PK
xi,j ← xi
while j ≤Ms or Ptarget,j ∈ ∅ do
xBj = DeepFool (xi,j)
wj = ApproxBoundary (x
B
j , Ptarget,j)
xi,j+1 = LinearSolver (xi,j , wj , x
B
j )
PK = RemovePixels (xi,j , xi,j+1, PK)
j = j + 1
end while
xi+1 ← xi,j
i = i+ 1
end while
return r = xi − x1
Algorithm 2 ApproxBoundary
Input: dense adversarial example xB , locally target
pixel set Ptarget
Output: normal vector w
w
′ ← ∇∑pi∈Ptarget fargmaxnfn(xB ,pi)(xB , pi)
−∇∑pi∈Ptarget fargmaxnfn(x,pi)(xB , pi)
w ← w
′
|w′ |
return w
target pixels set {P1, P2, ..., Pk}, our algorithm first to
select PK which has highest total probability score to
generate the locally target pixel set Ptarget of the target
category. In this process, we compute the total proba-
bility score of each category and choose the highest one
as the target category, then use all detected pixels and
potential pixels that are still not attacked successfully
of the target category to construct Ptarget.
Next, we generate sparse perturbation by minimiz-
ing ‖r‖0 according to Ptarget. Unfortunately, this is an
NP-hard problem. We adopt the method employed by
DeepFool [32] and SparseFool [30] to relax this problem
by iteratively approximating the classifier as a local lin-
ear function. However, these methods are proposed for
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Algorithm 3 Category-Wise DeepFool
Input: image x, locally target pixel set Ptarget
Output: dense adversarial example xB
Initialize: x0 ← x, i← 0, P0 ← Ptarget
while Pi ∩ Ptarget 6= ∅ do
for k 6= target do
wk ← ∇
∑
pj∈Pi fk(xi, pj)
−∇∑pj∈Pi ftarget(xi, pj)
scorek ←
∑
pj∈Pi fk(xi, pj)
end for
l← argmink 6=target |scorek|‖wk‖2
perti ← |scorel|‖wl‖22 wl
xi+1 ← xi + perti
Pi+1 ← RemovePixels (xi, xi+1, Pi)
i← i+ 1
end while
return xB ← xi+1
image classification. To satisfied the category-wise at-
tack on the object detector, we propose Category-Wise
DeepFool (CW-DF) (See Algorithm.3) to generate an
initial adversarial example xB at first. More specifically,
CW-DF computes perturbation on the Ptarget, which is
different from the original DeepFool computes pertur-
bation on the classifier’s output. Then, the SCA using
the ApproxBoundary (see Algorithm. 2) to approximate
the decision boundary. The decision boundary is locally
approximated with a hyperplane β passing through xB :
β
4
= {x : wT (x− xB) = 0} (3)
where w is the normal vector of the hyperplane β, which
is approximated by the following equation [30]:
w := ∇
n∑
i=1
fargmaxnfn(xB ,p)(x
B , p)
−∇
n∑
i=1
fargmaxnfn(x,p)(x
B , p)
(4)
Then, a sparser adversarial perturbation can be com-
puted by the LinearSolver process [30] and generate the
adversarial perturbation. An illustration of the key part
of the attack is given in Fig. 4.
To satisfy the problem (1), the pixel intensity of
adversarial example xi+1 = xi + pert should clipped
in [0, 255], where pert denotes the adversarial pertur-
bation. To better control the imperceptibility of our
Algorithm 4 RemovePixels
Input: image x, adversarial example xadv, target pixel
set P
Output: new target pixel set Pnew
Initialize: i← 0, Pnew ← ∅
for pi ∈ P do
if argmaxnfn(xadv, pi) = argmaxnfn(x, pi) then
Pnew ← Pnew ∪ pi
end if
i← i+ 1
end for
return Pnew
method, we constrain the pixel intensity of xi + pert to
lie in the interval ±S around the clean input x0, where
the S denotes the pixel clipped value. The value range
of the S is [0, 1].
0 ≤ x0 − S × 255 ≤ xi + pert ≤ x0 + S × 255 ≤ 255
(5)
Different S will lead to different attack performance
and the imperceptibility of our method.
Our algorithm alternates between RemoveP ixels 4
and generating Ptarget by selecting different Pk. After
attacking Ptarget in the each inner loop, we use Re-
movePixels to update PK , which takes as input xi,j ,
xi,j+1 and Pk. Specifically, the step of RemovePixels
first generates a new heatmap for the perturbed image
xi,j+1 with the detector. Then, RemovePixels checks
whether the probability score of the pixels on PK is
still higher than the tattack on the new heatmap. The
pixels with higher probability score than the tattack are
retained, and pixels with lower probability score is re-
moved from PK , generating an updated target pixel set
PK . If {P1, P2, ..., Pk} ∈ ∅, the attack for all objects of
x is successful and we output the generated adversarial
example.
Note that the SCA will not fall into an endless loop.
In some iterations, if SCA fails to attack any pixels of
the Ptarget in the inner loop, the SCA will attack the
same Ptarget in the next iteration. During this process,
SCA keeps accumulating perturbations on these pixels.
Thus, those perturbations reduce the probability score
of each pixel of the Ptarget, until the probability score
lower than the tattack. After that, Ptarget is attacked
successfully.
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Fig. 5 Illustration of DCA. First, we extract the heatmap for
each object category and compute gradient of each object cat-
egory. After normalizing the adversarial gradients with L∞,
we add up all gradients and generate adversarial perturbation
by further applying sign operation on it. Finally, we check
whether the attack is successful. If not, we further generate
new perturbation on existing adversarial example in the next
iteration.
3.4 Dense Category-wise Attack
To further investigate the effect of minimizing L∞ of the
perturbation, we set p = ∞ in our optimization prob-
lem (1). Previous studies FGSM [15] and PGD [28] are
two of the most widely used approaches to attack deep
neural networks by minimizing L∞. FGSM generates
adversarial examples by taking the maximum allowable
step in the direction of the gradient of the loss with re-
gard to the input image. Instead of taking a single large
step in FGSM, PGD iteratively takes smaller steps in
the direction of the gradient. Compared with FGSM,
PGD achieves higher attack performance and generates
smaller L∞ perturbations [28]. Therefore, our adver-
sarial perturbation generation procedure is base on the
PGD, which generates dense perturbations and named
as dense category-wise attack (DCA).
The DCA is summarized in Algorithm 5. Given an
input image x and category-wise target pixels set {P1,
P2, ..., Pk}, DCA only attacks target pixel set Pj for
each available category Cj that contains the detected
objects. The procedure of DCA is consists of two loops.
DCA computes local adversarial gradient rj for the cat-
egory Cj which is attacking in the inner loop j and add
up all rj to obtain total adversarial gradient ri for the
all detected categories {C1, C2, ..., Ck}, then generate
adversarial perturbation perti using ri in the outer loop
i.
In each iteration j of the inner loop, DCA computes
the gradient for all objects of Pj , which is different from
instance-wise attack algorithms that only computes the
Algorithm 5 Dense Category-wise Attack (DCA)
Input: image x, target pixel set {P1, P2, ..., Pk}
available categories {C1, C2, ..., Ck},
perturbation amplitude D
Output: perturbation pert
Initialize: x1 ← x, i← 1, j ← 1, Pi ← P, pert1 ← 0
while {P1, P2, ..., Pk} 6∈ ∅ and i ≤MD do
ri ← 0, j ← 1
while j ≤= k do
if Pj 6= ∅ then
losssum ←
∑
pn∈Pj CE (f(xi, pn), Cj)
rj ←5xi losssum
r′j ← rj‖rj‖∞
ri ← ri + r′j
end if
j ← j + 1
end while
perti ← DMD · sign(ri)
xi+1 ← xi + perti
{P1, ..., Pk} ← RemovePixels (xi, xi+1, {P1, ..., Pk})
i← i+ 1
end while
return pert = xi − x0
gradient for single object [50]. DCA first computes the
total loss losssum of Pj that composed of all detected
pixels of each available category Cj as follows:
losssum =
∑
pn∈Pj
CE (f(xi, pn), Cj) (6)
where the CE denotes the CrossEntropy.
Then, DCA computes local adversarial gradient rj
of the Pj on the losssum and normalizes it with L∞,
yielding r′j as follow:
rj =5xi losssum
r′j =
rj
‖rj‖∞
(7)
Finally, DCA adds up all r′j to generate total adversarial
gradient ri.
In each iteration of the outer loop, DCA obtains the
total adversarial gradient ri from the inner loop. Then,
in order to accelerate the algorithm, DCA computes
perturbation perti by applying sign operation to the
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total adversarial gradient ri [28]:
perti =
D
MD
· sign(ri) (8)
where MD denotes the maximum number of cycles of
the outer loop, term DMD is optimal max-norm con-
strained weight to constraint the amplitude of the perti
[16]. In the final of the outer loop, DCA useRemoveP ixels
(see Section 4 for details) to refresh the {P1, P2, ..., Pk}
on the xi+1.
Note that both SCA and DCA are considered as a
non-target multi-class attack method. But the SCA and
DCA can easily change to the target attack method.
4 Experiment
4.1 Experimental Setup
PascalVOC/MS-COCO. We evaluate our method
on two popular object detection benchmarks: PascalVOC
[13] and MS-COCO [26].
For the PascalVOC dataset, we follow previous re-
search [50,55] to split it to training/testing split: the
trainval sets of PascalVOC 2007 and PascalVOC 2012
are used as the training set to train all object detection
models, and our adversarial examples are generated on
the test set of PascalVOC 2007, which consists of 4,592
images. Both PascalVOC 2007 and PascalVOC 2012
has 20 categories.
For the MS-COCO dataset, we train the object de-
tection models with the training set of MS-COCO 2017
which includes 118,000 images, and the test set consists
of 5,000 images. The MS-COCO 2017 dataset contains
80 object categories.
Evaluation Metrics. We use three metrics for the at-
tacking performance of the generated adversarial exam-
ples:
i) Attack Success Rate (ASR): ASR measures
the attack success rate of the generated adversarial ex-
amples. It is computed by calculating the mAP (mean
Average Precision) loss when substituting the original
input images with the generated adversarial examples.
ASR = 1− mAPattack
mAPclean
(9)
where mAPattack denotes the mAP of detector with
adversarial example, mAPattack denotes the mAP of
clean input.
ii) Attack Transfer Ratio (ATR): Transferabil-
ity is an important property of the adversarial exam-
ples [37]. We evaluate the transferability by computing
ATR:
ATR =
ASRtarget
ASRorigin
(10)
where ASRtarget represents the ASR of the attacked
target model and ASRorigin denotes the ASR of the
model which generate the adversarial example. Higher
ATR denotes better transferability.
iii) Perceptibility: The adversarial perturbation’s
perceptibility is quantified by its Lp norms. Specifically,
PL2 and PL0 are used, which are defined as follows.
i) PL2 : L2 norm of the perturbation. A lower L2
value usually signifies that the perturbation is more im-
perceptible for the human. Formally,
PL2 =
√
1
k
∑
r2k (11)
where the k is the number of the pixels. We also nor-
malized the PL2 in [0, 1].
ii) PL0 : L0 norm of the perturbation. A lower L0
value means that fewer pixels are changed during the
attack. We compute PL0 by measuring the proportion
of changed pixels.
White-Box/Black-Box Attacks. We conducted both
white-box and black-box attacks on several popular ob-
ject detection models:
i) White-Box Attack: We conducted attack ex-
periments on two models. Both models use CenterNet
but with different backbones: Resdcn18 [19] and DLA34
[53]. We trained these two models on PascalVOC and
MS-COCO respectively. We obtain four models from
these two backbones and two datasets. We evaluate the
attack performance of SCA and DCA on each model.
In this paper, we denote R18 as CenterNet with Res-
dcn18 backbone and DLA34 as CenterNet with DLA34
backbone.
ii) Black-Box Attack: We classify the black-box
attack methods into two categories: cross-backbone and
cross-network. In the cross-backbone attack, we evalu-
ate the transferability with Resdcn101[19] on PascalVOC
and MS-COCO. In the cross-network attack, we use
not only anchor-free object detector, but also two-stage
anchor-based detectors: CornerNet [22], Faster-RCNN [41]
and SSD300 [27]. Faster-RCNN and SSD300 are only
tested on PascalVOC. CornerNet is only tested on the
MS-COCO. The backbone is Hourglass [34]. In this pa-
per, we denote FR as Faster-RCNN with VGG16 [43]
backbone.
Quantitative Analysis We provide the perceptibility
result of our methods in 4.4. We also provide the result
of different pixel clipped value S of SCA in 4.5.
Implementation Details. For both white-box and
black-box attacks, we clip the range of the pixel val-
ues of the adversarial examples to [0, 255]. The attack
threshold tattack in all experiments set to 0.1.
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From
To Resdcn18 DLA34 Resdcn101 CornerNet
mAP ATR mAP ATR mAP ATR mAP ATR
Clean 0.29 – 0.37 – 0.37 – 0.43 –
R18-DCA 0.01 1.00 0.29 0.21 0.28 0.25 0.38 0.12
DLA34-DCA 0.10 0.67 0.01 1.00 0.12 0.69 0.13 0.72
R18-SCA 0.11 1.00 0.27 0.41 0.24 0.57 0.35 0.30
DLA34-SCA 0.07 0.92 0.06 1.00 0.09 0.92 0.12 0.88
Table 1 Black-box attack results on the MS-COCO dataset. From in the leftmost column denotes the models where adver-
sarial examples generated from. To in the top row means the attacked models that adversarial examples transfer to.
From
To Resdcn18 DLA34 Resdcn101 Faster-RCNN SSD300
mAP ATR mAP ATR mAP ATR mAP ATR mAP ATR
Clean 0.67 – 0.77 – 0.76 – 0.71 – 0.77 –
DAG [49] 0.65 0.19 0.75 0.16 0.74 0.16 0.60 1.00 0.76 0.08
R18-DCA 0.10 1.00 0.62 0.23 0.65 0.17 0.61 0.17 0.72 0.08
DLA34-DCA 0.50 0.28 0.07 1.00 0.62 0.2 0.53 0.28 0.67 0.14
R18-SCA 0.31 1.00 0.62 0.36 0.61 0.37 0.55 0.42 0.70 0.17
DLA34-SCA 0.42 0.90 0.41 1.00 0.53 0.65 0.44 0.82 0.62 0.42
Table 2 Black-box attack results on the PascalVOC dataset. From and To means the same as Table 1.
Method Network Clean Attack ASR (%) Time (s)
P
as
ca
lV
O
C
DAG [50] FR 0.70 0.050 0.92 9.8
UEA [48] FR 0.70 0.050 0.93 –
SCA R18 0.67 0.060 0.91 20.1
SCA DLA34 0.77 0.110 0.86 91.5
DCA R18 0.67 0.070 0.90 0.3
DCA DLA34 0.77 0.050 0.94 0.7
M
S
-C
O
C
O SCA R18 0.29 0.027 0.91 50.4
SCA DLA34 0.37 0.030 0.92 216.0
DCA R18 0.29 0.002 0.99 1.5
DCA DLA34 0.37 0.002 0.99 2.4
Table 3 Overall white-box performance comparison. The top row denotes the metrics. Clean and Attack denotes the mAP
of clean input and adversarial examples. Time is the average time to generate an adversarial example.
4.2 White-Box Attack Result
We first compare the white-box attack results of our
method with the state-of-the-art attack algorithms on
PascalVOC. The attack results on CenterNet are sum-
marized in Table 3. From the top half of Table 3, we find
that: (1) DCA achieve higher ASR than DAG and UEA
and the SCA achieve state-of-art attack performance.
(2) DCA is 14 times faster than the DAG. Because
UEA is based on GAN, the total attack time should
include the training time, but UEA is not open source
and we cannot confirm the training time, so we set the
attack time of UEA as N/A.
The bottom half of Table 3 shows the attack perfor-
mance of our methods on MS-COCO. We only compare
ASR with DAG and UEA as they didn’t report their
performance on MS-COCO. ASR of SCA on two back-
bones achieve almost the same ASR as the DAG and
UEA on PascalVOC: 92.8% and the ASR of DCA is
higher than 99%, meaning that almost all objects can
not be detected correctly. It is obvious that both DCA
and SCA achieve state-of-the-art attack performance on
different models. We also show some qualitative com-
parison results between DAG and our methods in Fig. 8
and Fig. 9.
Fig. 6 shows the Average Precision (AP) of each ob-
ject category on clean input and the adversarial exam-
ples generated by Centernet with Resdcn18 and DLA34
backbones. The AP drops roughly by the same percent-
age for all object categories. Fig. 7 shows the AP and
Average Recall (AR) of SCA and DCA. We noticed
that small objects are more vulnerable to adversarial
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Fig. 6 Quantitative analysis on PascalVOC. Top: The AP of each object category on the clean input and adversarial examples
generated by CenterNet with Resdcn18 backbones on PascalVOC. Bottom: The AP of each object category of clean input
and adversarial examples on DLA34.
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Fig. 7 Quantitative analysis on MS-COCO. Top: The AP and AR of SCA and DCA on MS-COCO. The backbone of
CenterNet is Resdcn18. Bottom: The AP and AR of SCA and DCAon MS-COCO. The backbone of CenterNet is DLA3.
examples than bigger ones. One possible explanation is
that bigger objects usually have more key points than
the smaller objects on the heatmap and our algorithm
needs to attack all of them.
4.3 Black-Box Attack Result/Transferability
To simulate a real-world attack transferring scenario,
we use DCA or SCA to generate the adversarial ex-
amples on the CenterNet and save them in the JPG
format. Saving the adversarial examples in JPG format
(JPG compression) may cause them to lose the ability
to attack the target models [12] as some key detailed
information may be lost during the process. Then, we
reload them to attack the target models and compute
mAP . This puts a higher demand on the adversarial
examples and further guarantees the transferability of
the adversarial examples.
Attack transferability on PascalVOC. The adver-
sarial examples are generated on CenterNet with Res-
dcn18 and DLA34 backbones respectively. We use these
adversarial examples to attack the other four models.
All these five models are trained on the PascalVOC. We
can find the DCA is more robust to JPG compression
than SCA. But SCA achieves higher ATR than DCA in
the black-box test. The results are summarized in Ta-
ble 2, which demonstrate that the generated adversarial
examples can successfully transfer to CenterNet with
other different backbones, including completely differ-
ent types of object detectors: Faster-RCNN and SSD.
From Table 2, we also find that DAG is sensitive
to JPG compression, especially when the adversarial
examples are used to attack Faster-RCNN. And adver-
sarial examples generated by DAG basically lose the
ability to attack CenterNet and SSD300. It means both
DCA and SCA are better than DAG regarding trans-
ferability and the ability to resist JPG compression.
Attack Transferability on MS-COCO. As with Pas-
calVOC, we generate adversarial examples on Center-
net with Resdcn18 and DLA34 backbones and then use
them to attack other object detection models. The re-
sults are summarized in Table 1.
The generated adversarial examples are not only can
be used to attack other CenterNet with different back-
bones but also validity to attack CornerNet.
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Fig. 8 Each row is an example. Column 1: Detection results of clean inputs on CenterNet. Column 2&3: DAG perturbations
and DAG attacked results on Faster-RCNN. Column 4&5: DCA perturbations and DCA attacked results on CenterNet.
Column 6&7: SCA perturbations and SCA attacked results on CenterNet. Note that in Column 6, from top to bottom, the
percentage of the changed pixels for each SCA perturbations are: 3.12% 3.4%, 3.51%, 5.91%, 3.35%, 6.04%, 11.72%, 8.19%.
We can see that the perturbations of DCA and SCA are smaller than the DAG’s. Notably, the proposed SCA only changes a
few percentage of pixels. To better show the perturbation, we have multiplied the intensity of all perturbation images by 10.
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Fig. 9 Each column is an example. Column 1: Detection results of clean inputs on CenterNet. Column 2&3: DAG per-
turbations and DAG attacked results on Faster-RCNN. Column 4&5: DCA perturbations and DCA attacked results on
CenterNet. Column 6&7: SCA perturbations and SCA attacked results on CenterNet. Note that in Column 6, from top
to bottom, the percentage of the changed pixels for each SCA perturbations are: 3.75%, 2.26%, 5.99%, 3.97%, 9.12%, 3.97%,
2.00%, 2.09%, 3.93%, 2.88%. We can see that the perturbations of DCA and SCA are smaller than the DAG’s. Notably, the
proposed SCA only changes a few percentage of pixels. To better show the perturbation, we have multiplied the intensity of
all perturbation images by 10.test
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Fig. 10 Overall and Dog-only heatmaps generated by
DLA34 and Resdcn18. The heatmap from DLA34 is more
concentrated on the objects.
Network pl2 pl0
DAG 2.8× 10−3 ≥ 99%
R18-Pascal 5.1× 10−3 (DCA) 0.22% (SCA)
DLA34-Pascal 5.1× 10−3 (DCA) 0.27% (SCA)
R18-COCO 4.8× 10−3 (DCA) 0.39% (SCA)
DLA34-COCO 5.2× 10−3 (DCA) 0.65% (SCA)
Table 4 Quantitative perceptibility results of the generated
perturbation.
The overall performance of MS-COCO is higher than
on PascalVOC. This is because the average mAP of
CenterNet on MS-COCO is lower than on PascalVOC.
As a result, it makes the confidence of detection accu-
racies on MS-COCO lower than that on PascalVOC.
Lower confidence means that the detector is weaker to
defend against the adversarial examples. The adversar-
ial example is robust to JPG compression on MS-COCO
than on PascalVOC.
The adversarial examples generated on the DLA34
backbone achieve higher ASR and ATP than back-
bone Resdcn18, especially on MS-COCO. We also no-
ticed that the adversarial examples generated by mod-
els with higher detection performance achieve better
attack performance. We guess this is because they pro-
duce more accurate heatmaps. To confirm this, we gen-
erate heatmaps for a randomly selected image with Cen-
ternet with DLA34 and Resdcn18 backbones (DLA34
achieves better detection performance). The heatmaps
of the category dog are shown in Fig. 10. It demon-
strates that the heatmap generated by DLA34 is more
concentrated on the dogs in the image, while the heatmap
predicted by Resdcn18 is more spread out.
4.4 Perceptibility
The perceptibility of the adversarial perturbations of
DCA and SCA are shown on Table 4. We evaluate the
perceptibility of DCA by pl2 and pl0. pl0 of SCA is
lower than 1%, meaning that SCA can change only a
few pixels to fool the detectors. It demonstrates that
SCA generates sparse adversarial perturbations.
Although the average pl2 of DCA is higher than
DAG, the perturbations generated by DCA are still
hard to be distinguished by human. The pl0 of SCA is
lower than 1%, meaning that SCA is successful to gen-
erate sparse adversarial perturbation. The pl0 of DAG
and DCA are higher than 99%, far more than SCA.
4.5 Pixel Clipped Value
In SCA, we clipping the intensity of perturbation
to lie in the interval xi ± S on each pixel of the input
image xi, so the perturbation is imperceptible to the
human eyes. The results for different S are shown in
Fig. 11.
We can find that higher S will lead to lower Pl0
and time consumption of our method. SCA achieves
high white-box attack performance when S higher than
0.05. When S lower than 0.05, the white-box attack
performance will be worse with a decrease of S .
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose two category-wise attack
algorithms, SCA and DCA, for attacking anchor-free
object detectors. Both SCA and DCA focus on global
and high-level semantic information to generate adver-
sarial perturbations. SCA is effectively in generating
sparse perturbations by generating special decision bound-
ary and approximating dense adversarial examples. DCA
generates perturbations by computing gradients accord-
ing to global valid categories.
Both SCA and DCA achieve state-of-the-art attack
performance in the white-box attack experiments with
CenterNet, where DCA is dozens of times faster than
DAG and SCA while changing less than 1% pixels. We
also test the transferability of DCA and SCA under
JPG compression. Both SCA and DCA achieve better
attack transferring performance than DAG. The adver-
sarial examples generated by our methods are less sen-
sitive to JPG compression than DAG.
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Fig. 11 The connection between S and Perturbation: Top:
The ASR of SCA perturbation for different S . Middle: The
Pl0 of SCA perturbation for different S . Bottom: The time
required for SCA to generate perturbations for different S .
The result shows higher S will leading lower Pl0 and time
consumption of our method. SCA achieves high white-box at-
tack performance when S higher than 0.05. When S lower
than 0.05, the white-box attack performance will be worse
with a decrease of S . All results are tested on 100 image
samples of MS-COCO and CenterNet with Resdcn18 back-
bone.
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